![]() ![]() Max Hoffmann Hindenburg and Ludendorff would largely implement Hoffmann’s plan. A new plan was already underway on the German side, following the initiative of staff officer Lt. ![]() Moltke relieved Prittwitz of command, and replaced him with a recent retiree, Paul von Hindenburg, and a staff officer who had distinguished himself in the attack on Liege, Erich Ludendorff. He wished to set up a new line of defense on the other side of the Vistula. His intention, which he freely related to Chief of Staff Moltke, was to hold off both invaders while he prepared a retreat. When Prittwitz determined that another army was approaching from the south, he ordered his men to withdraw from Gumbinnen. First contact was made in the northeast on August 19, when Rennenkampf’s army engaged German defenders near Gumbinnen. The German Eighth Army was commanded by Max von Prittwitz, and he responded to the dual incursion with static defense. Still, the Russians experienced a small degree of luck at the beginning of the campaign. There were several dangers in this plan, however: it relied upon the cooperation of two army commanders, Pavel Rennenkampf and Aleksandr Samsonov, who were known to hate each other coordination was effected in part through the new medium of radio, and the Russians had not yet learned the wisdom of encoding their messages and the path of Second Army lay through the Masurian Lakes, which necessarily broke up formations and impeded cooperation. Against them stood a single German army, the Eighth. ![]() Because the Germans did not invade Russia, First and Second armies were to invade East Prussia from the east and south, respectively. The First and Second Armies were earmarked for East Prussia, while three other armies were directed towards Austria-Hungary, and the last was held in reserve. When war broke out in 1914, Russia had six armies stationed in the area. This is precisely what happened at Tannenberg. In this way, an outnumbered defender can repulse a larger invasion. Significantly, German tactical theory since the time of Frederick the Great emphasized rapid maneuver as a means by which a smaller force could defeat a larger force: by sending all of one’s forces against part of the enemy’s force, an overall numerical disadvantage can become a local numerical advantage. General Staff planning since the tenure of Count Schlieffen concentrated on a policy of knocking out the French as soon as possible, while holding the Russians at bay until Germany could focus the bulk of its forces against them. Ever since the end of Bismarck’s diplomatic system, Germany anticipated that it would face at least two powerful enemies, France and Russia, whenever a major war actually erupted. Strategically, German planning was fundamentally defensive. On the German side of the border, an extensive series of lakes known as the Masurian Lakes dominated the southern part of East Prussia. The Russian part of Poland, centered around Warsaw, extended like a bulge into Central Europe, surrounded by East Prussia, Pomerania and Silesia in Germany, and by the Austro-Hungarian Empire to its south. In 1914, the border between the German and Russian empires passed through modern Poland. By facing their foes piecemeal, and taking advantage of interior lines of communication, the Germans were able to defeat an attacking force nearly twice their size. ![]() It is the battle that forged the partnership, and the subsequent legend, of the German generals Hindenburg and Ludendorff. As pointed out by Christopher Clark, the actual Tannenberg is some thirty kilometres to the west, and there was no intrinsic reason - other than the historical battle and its emotive resonance in the narrative of German Nationalism - to name for it the 1914 battle.The Battle of Tannenberg (1914) was the first decisive clash between the Germans and the Russians in the twentieth century. The battle is notable particularly for a number of rapid movements of complete German corps by train, allowing a single German Army to present a single front to both Russian Armies.Īlthough the battle took place near Allenstein, Ludendorff's aide Max Hoffmann suggested to name it after Tannenberg in an attempt to erase the defeat in the medieval Battle of Grunwald (Tannenberg) of 1410 in which the Teutonic forces were defeated by the Poles and Lithuanians. A series of follow-up battles destroyed the majority of the First Army as well, and kept the Russians off-balance until the spring of 1915. The battle resulted in the almost complete destruction of the Russian Second Army. The Battle of Tannenberg was in August 1914 a decisive engagement between the Russian Empire and the German Empire in the first days of World War I, fought by the Russian First and Second Armies and the German Eighth Army between 23 August and 30 August 1914. ![]()
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